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The Uniting of Europe and the Foundation of EU Studies: Revisiting 






This article suggests that the neofunctionalist theoretical legacy left by Ernst B. Haas 
is somewhat richer and more prescient that many contemporary discussants allow. 
The article develops an argument for routine and detailed re-reading of the corpus of 
neofunctionalist work (and that of Haas in particular), not only to disabuse 
contemporary students and scholars of the normally static and stylised reading that 
discussion of the theory provokes, but also to suggest that the conceptual repertoire of 
neofunctionalism is able to speak directly to current EU studies and comparative 
regionalism. Neofunctionalism is situated in its social scientific context before the 
theory’s supposed erroneous reliance on the concept of ‘spillover’ is discussed 
critically. A case is then made for viewing Haas’s neofunctionalism as a dynamic 
theory that not only corresponded to established social scientific norms, but did so in 
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The Uniting of Europe and the Foundation of EU Studies: 






Academic fields of study cannot help but tell stories about themselves. In almost 
every discipline or sub-discipline, we find tales about antecedents, foundation, 
consolidation, evolution, progress and – oftentimes – error strewn blind alleys. It is 
actually rather unusual to tell these stories via detailed disciplinary histories. 
Normally, practitioners in given fields have a sense of how their area has developed 
over time and these accounts are not usually great sources of contention. After all, the 
cadence of academic discourse is such that we habitually view ourselves as 
progressing, adding to knowledge and – ultimately – correcting previous 
misconceptions in ways that bring us closer to a truthful understanding of our object 
of study. Of course, in the social sciences, we also have to contend with the 
probability that our very object of study may be undergoing processes of change that 
perhaps necessitate revisions in the way that we analyse it. Meanwhile, mainstream 
social science (for want of a better phrase) has long sought to deploy approaches that 
optimise the chance of uncovering routine dynamics and regularities, which in turn 
facilitate an explanatory and predictive form of enquiry.  
 
Theoretical approaches within a field are, therefore, usually judged in terms of two 
sorts of criterion. The first insists that the theory is capable of asking meaningful 
questions about a given object, while insisting at the same time that a theory’s success 
be judged in terms of its capacity to generate findings consistent with its derivative 
hypotheses. The second criterion is concerned with the theory’s internal consistency 
and its conformity (or otherwise) to established rules of social scientific practice.  
 
Such has been the fate of Ernst Haas’s theoretical legacy to EU studies. There can be 
few students of the EU who are not made aware, at least in passing, about 
neofunctionalist theory. It is rare to find a textbook on the subject that fails to mention 
it and even its most trenchant critics feel obliged still to frame their analysis in terms 
of the shadow cast by neofunctionalism. For many of these neofunctionalism 
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represents a coherent ‘other’ against which their own (supposedly preferable) 
approaches to explaining the EU and elements of European integration can be 
defined. The symbolic importance of Haas’s neofunctionalism should – at one level – 
come as no surprise. It is not hyperbole to suggest that The Uniting of Europe (Haas, 
1958) represents the founding moment of the field of what we now routinely term 
‘EU studies’. At the same time, however, neofunctionalism is frequently represented 
as a theory of EU studies past with comparatively little to say to EU studies present.  
 
This article presents a re-reading and a re-evaluation of the neofunctionalist theory 
within which Haas’s work is so prominent. It is a re-reading that suggesting Haas 
should be routinely revisited by students and scholars of the EU and comparative 
regional integration, not least because he has been mis-read to the extent that the 
commonplace stories told about neofunctionalism tend to draw over-exaggerated 
boundaries between past and present EU studies on the one hand and International 
Relations and political science on the other. In so doing they render inadmissible and 
under-read a remarkably rich literature as neofunctionalism is assigned a very 
particular, pre-historical and thus somewhat marginal place within the unfolding story 
of the field.  
 
To the end of re-positioning neofunctionalism as still salient toolkit for EU studies, 
this article proceeds in three broad steps. The first involves situating neofunctionalism 
in its appropriate social scientific context. This carries with it a number of interesting 
implications for how we might think about the synergies and oppositions within EU 
studies, but it only a partial move. Thus secondly, the paper interrogates the extent to 
which neofunctionalism’s alleged obsolescence might be attached to an over-reliance 
on the notion of spillover, which in turn is said to dramatically attenuate the theory’s 
explanatory leverage. The case here is found to be not proven. Indeed and linking 
with the third section, the paper emphasises the dynamic – as opposed to static – 
qualities displayed by neofunctionalism in its period of ascendancy. The paper 
concludes two things about Haas’s neofunctionalism. The first is that the conceptual 
repertoire of neofunctionalism still has much to say to both EU studies and to studies 
of comparative regionalism. The second point draws attention to the lessons that 
should be drawn from neofunctionalism about the ways in which an open, pluralistic 
EU studies might be continued.   
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 The intellectual coordinates of neofunctionalism 
One route to dismissing the continuing salience of neofunctionalism in contemporary 
EU studies is to claim that it is a theory emanating from the discipline of International 
Relations (IR). The case is made via a secondary claim that IR is congenitally 
incapable of asking appropriate questions about the EU political system where the 
prevailing dynamics are said to resemble the Laswellian constants in which 
(comparative) political science is so well-versed. Moreover because neofunctionalism 
is a theory of integration and because the day-to-day stakeholders within the EU 
polity are not motivated to act by a primary interest in the politics of integration, EU 
studies needs to be steered away from the problematique that generated 
neofunctionalist theorising (Hix, 1994). While Haas’s self-definition as an IR scholar 
lends a degree of prima facie credence to the argument (see Kreisler, 2000), it runs 
into trouble when the broader intellectual location of neofunctionalism is considered 
in more detail.1 And here, Haas is neatly lined up as an impeccable Weberian, as a 
recent evaluation of his work suggests (Ruggie, Katzenstein, Keohane and Schmitter, 
2005). This feeds not only his particular interests – the possibility of the rational 
displacing the irrational in human life and the interplay between actors and ideas – but 
also his fundamental take on social science and its possibilities. This is crucial to a 
proper understanding of the intellectual space within which neofunctionalism arose. It 
is also important to read Haas and the neofunctionalists contextually. Like all 
academic projects, neofunctionalism was not solely related to its object of study 
(European integration/the European Communities), but also to the prevailing mores 
and cultures of academic discourse during its lifespan. To read the work of Haas 
purely from the vantage point of EU studies present runs the risk of imposing a 
‘presentist’ reading of the theory, where our claims about the neofunctionalist project 
have more to do with establishing a coherent and stylised ‘other’, from which we – 
inevitably – are differentiated.  
 
Haas described neofunctionalism as emerging as a alternate position to IR’s dominant 
theoretical streams of the 1950s. Realism’s tendency to inscribe a power-centred logic 
onto the international system was as problematic for Haas as liberal idealism’s 
pretence that conflict might be transcended through the creation of a Kantian 
international legal order (Haas, 2004: xiv). Haas’s critique of this prevailing academic 
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discourse drew fuel from two primary sources. First, there was a clear intellectual 
debt to the functionalist thinking of David Mitrany.2 Haas was clearly attracted by 
functionalism’s emphasis on the idea that post-national institution-building 
would/should premised upon a technocratic engagement with human welfare needs. 
This helped to form an ontological claim of early neofunctionalism: that human 
governance was becoming a largely managerial exercise and that grand ideological 
narratives were on the wane (Haas, 1964: 30-35; Haas, 1968: xix). The most obvious 
point of departure from functionalism was the neofunctionalists’ emphasis on the 
inherently regional quality of institution-building, as opposed to Mitrany’s insistence 
on the flexible and variegated character of post-national institutional forms (a point 
noted by Mitrany, 1965). This differentiation is explained by the oft-neglected interest 
of neofunctionalism in the ‘background conditions’ that provoke institutionalised 
integration (discussed below). 
 
The second departure from the recurring realist-idealist conversation is rather more 
significant. Haas (and his colleagues) imported a ‘professionalised’ social scientific 
mindset into their studies of European integration and it is here that the boundaries 
between Haas the political scientist and Haas the IR scholar become fuzzy, if not 
unsustainable. In this respect Haasian neofunctionalism is of the same intellectual 
moment that produced Karl Deutsch’s transactionalist or communications approach to 
the integration of security communities (Deutsch, 1964; Deutsch et al, 1957). The 
emphasis, in other words, is on the application of agreed intellectual precepts that 
together provoke a ‘rigorous’ approach to the construction of theory. This is 
transcendent of the IR of the 1950s because of its grounding in empirical investigation 
and its insistence that theory-derived propositions be exposed to robust empirical tests 
using the latest intellectual technologies. It goes beyond purely empiricist treatments 
of European integration because of the analytical leverage that is said to follow from a 
systematic approach to theory building (see De Vree, 1972; Kaiser, 1965). The first 
edition of The Uniting of Europe (Haas, 1958) is a densely empirical study of the 
early years of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and was largely 
treated as such by its early reviewers (see Rosamond, 2000: 74). But a careful 
reading, particularly of chapters 1 and 8, shows how Haas was positioning his study 
of the ECSC as an exercise in grounding a set of general propositions about regional 
integration in the European experience.  
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 Neofunctionalism is also shot through, from the outset, with a definite interest in the 
expectation that modern industrialised societies are characterised by a tendency 
towards social pluralism. In this respect Haas’s initiation of neofunctionalism 
coincided neatly with the high tide of the new pluralist political science that so took 
hold of US political science in the 1950s (Haas, 1964: 35-40; Haas, 2004: xiv; 
Lindberg, 1963: 9). This positioning has at least five implications for the conduct of 
neofunctionalist arguments. The first reinforces the argument made above about the 
style of social science that was inscribed into neofunctionalism from its birth. Pluralist 
political science does not simply describe a particular privileging of certain sorts of 
social actors. It is also bound up with the project to place the study of political 
phenomena onto ground where systematic explanation is the norm. Second it fuelled 
Haas’s conviction that classical IR was serially flawed. Put simply he criticised the 
notion that complex modern societies are straightforwardly and permanently attuned 
to security imperatives with its corollary that international politics must, therefore, be 
nothing more than (a national) interest-based Hobbesian anarchy. Third, it shifted 
investigative attention away from national executives and international exchange and 
towards the significance (if not necessarily the primacy) of organised interests and the 
role that their dynamic interaction might play in the production of integration 
outcomes. Fourth, the affiliation to pluralism is integral to the very understanding of 
integration with which Haas’s work began: 
 
Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several 
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations 
and political activities to a new center, whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result is a 
new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones (Haas, 
1958: 16) 
 
Insofar as integration involved an outcome (and it is certainly worth noting Haas’s 
emphasis on process in his definition), then Haas imagined an emergent form of 
political community that was at least analogous to the domestic pluralist polity. It is 
also important to note his preference for the phrase ‘superimposed over’ rather than – 
say – ‘replacing’. This might even be read as an anticipation of the themes of the 
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multi-level governance literature, which speaks of the EU polity in terms of co-
existent and overlapping levels of political action where policy stakeholders are 
relatively mobile between the various tiers of governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). 
The key, however, is the emphasis on the dynamism towards integration that follows 
from the self-regarding activities of political actors whose ‘loyalties’ are defined in 
terms of collective perceptions of how their interests might best be served. Such 
affiliational shifts were also characteristic of earlier functionalist reasoning, but 
neofunctionalists were rather more interested in the altering cognitions of collective 
actors than those of mass publics. The fifth implication of the neofunctionalist 
concern with pluralism is the built-in recognition, later teased out as neofunctionalism 
developed, that the propensity to integrate is greater among societies that are 
characterised by pluralist complexity. Here it is important to reiterate that Haas’s 
pluralism did not lead him to conclude that social pluralism was an ever-present 
feature of all societies. Rather he hypothesised that those societies characterised by 
pluralism would be more likely to engage in integration. Moreover, his affiliation to 
pluralism was emblematic of an attachment to a conception of social science that 
required the clear specification of variables and the postulation of testable hypotheses.   
 
Haas admitted that the epistemological and ontological cartography of 
neofunctionalism was not openly acknowledged in its founding texts (Haas, 2001: 29, 
fn1). His last essays on the study of European integration (Haas, 2001; 2004) are 
perhaps best read as exercises in the retrospective intellectual placement of 
neofunctionalism that aimed to reveal the theory’s continuing salience via-à-vis an 
assortment of contemporary rivals. What Haas achieved in these papers was a very 
clear presentation of neofunctionalism as a variety of rationalist theory:  
 
Its ontology is ‘soft’ rational choice: social actors, in seeking to realize 
their value-derived interests, will choose whatever means are made 
available by the prevailing democratic order. If thwarted, they will rethink 
their values, redefine their interests, and choose new means to realize 
them … The ontology is not materialistic: values shape interests, and 
values include many nonmaterial elements (Haas, 2004: xv). 
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As suggested already, neofunctionalism is a theory that relies on actors – be they 
social groups or institutions – taking a utilitarian approach to the fulfilment of their 
interests. There is obvious differentiation from harder versions of rationalism since 
Haas’s re-presentation of neofunctionalism allows space for the endogenisation of 
interests through ongoing interaction. Hard rational choice – described by one recent 
intervention as the ‘normal science’ of EU studies (Dowding, 2000) – treats actors’ 
preferences as (a) exogenous and to interaction and (b) formally predictable, and 
institutional exchange as a mechanism for delivering positive sum bargains subject to 
the formal rules of those institutions (Haas’s dispute with hard rational choice is 
summarised in Haas, 2001: 30, fn4). Most intriguingly, Haas used these final essays 
to search for affinities between neofunctionalism and (what is now labelled) 
constructivism. His interest in developing a ‘pragmatic constructivism’ (Haas, 2004) 
out of neofunctionalism’s legacy engaged his work with that of a particular breed of 
constructivists who – epistemologically at least – share Haas’s commitment to the 
precepts of theory building. It also opens for scrutiny the extent to which 
neofunctionalism in its heyday was a theory that took seriously the cognitions of 
actors to the extent that it was able to link the dynamic pursuit of objectives in 
conditions of societal pluralism to the capacity to change the identitive qualities of 
those very actors. Haas reiterated that neofunctionalism was an approach to the 
question of community building (2001: 29). In that respect it shares a primary concern 
with Deutsch’s transactionalism, an approach that has also recently become 
susceptible to constructivist capture (Adler and Barnett, 1998). Also the deployment 
of constructivist vocabulary allows neofunctionalists to cope with some of the 
problems that their approach to integration encountered in the light of the experience 
of the European Communities from the mid-1960s. Consider the following passage 
from Haas’s essay The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, which is often 
(mis)read as an obituary for neofunctionalism: 
 
In large measure the disappointment resulted from not allowing for the 
possibility that actors’ motives change, that interests and values 
considered salient and positively linked to integration may give way to 
different interests and to values with a more equivocal impact on 
integration (Haas, 1975: 8). 
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The point is not necessarily that neofunctionalists failed to incorporate a theory of 
cognitive change into their overall approach, but that it was probably always there 
within their conception of loyalties, persuasion, the evolution of expectations (Haas, 
1958: 292) and interests.     
  
What is also striking about the retrospective reminder that neofunctionalism belongs 
to the soft rationalist family tree is how this allows us to recast the supposed ‘great 
debate’ between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, which many appear to 
take as the (unhelpfully) dominant conversation in EU studies. At a metatheoretical 
level neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism (especially as systematised by 
Andrew Moravcsik, 1998) are pretty much indistinguishable. Haas took this 
somewhat further in his later essays. He playfully noted that liberal 
intergovernmentalism’s (LI’s)  
 
core assumptions are identical with those of [neofunctionalism] and seem 
quite compatible with certain kinds of constructivism as well. It is difficult 
to understand why he makes such extraordinary efforts to distinguish his 
work from those sources (Haas, 2001: 30, fn10).  
 
Perhaps the key point here is that, from the vantage point of rethinking images of the 
disciplinary history of EU studies, the supposed ‘great debate’ between 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism is not such a great debate after all. This 
paper has already suggested that neofunctionalism has been narrated into a coherent 
and stereotypical ‘other’ to allow particular claims about the appropriate disciplinary 
identity of EU studies to be made. It may also be the case, therefore, that (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism has been perhaps premature in casting neofunctionalism as its 
‘other’ and that LI’s advancement has been partly conditional on the plausibility of 
this claim.  
 
Spillover: neofunctionalism’s intellectual error? 
Moreover, if Haas was correct to suggest that the familial resemblance between 
constructivism and neofunctionalism is indicative of the latter’s continuing salience, 
then the work of Haas and his associates should be reintegrated into the field and not 
simply be treated as a foundational approach that is talked about only as a theory from 
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which we (in our latter day wisdom) have moved on. The foregoing is a reminder that 
a disciplinary history/sociology of knowledge approach to Haas’s work is likely to 
chip away at the numerous truth claims that are made about neofunctionalism. But a 
full reinstatement will require a rather deeper analysis. In particular, we return here to 
Haas’s own insistence that his approach to social science is a method of securing 
analytical leverage and transcending descriptive empiricism.  
 
The neofunctionalist project was from the outset a comparative exercise in regional 
integration theory. The explicit purpose of the neofunctionalists was to utilise the 
pioneering European experience of integration to generate hypotheses for testing in 
other contexts. In short, the plan was to develop not a theory of European integration, 
but to arrive at a more generic portfolio of propositions about the dynamics of 
integration in any context (Barrera and Haas, 1969; Haas, 1961; 1967; Haas and 
Schmitter, 1964). Without this capacity for application beyond the European case, 
neofunctionalism would become nothing more than (at best) an exercise in dense 
description. N would be 1 and, as a result, alternative methods of securing analytical 
leverage would need to be found.3  The primary problem that is often used to show 
why neofunctionalism failed in this enterprise is that (again at best) neofunctionalism 
discovered a series of dynamics that were able to account for the early years of 
European integration (roughly 1950-1965), but then emphatically failed to account for 
the evolution of the Communities thereafter. In addition, because these dynamics 
were specific – both temporally and spatially – there was no way in which 
neofunctionalism could operate as a general theory.  
 
At the core of this problem, it seems, was Haas’s discovery in The Uniting of Europe 
of the process of ‘spillover’.4  Spillover was originally used to capture the process 
through which the expectations of social actors shifted in the direction of support for 
further integration. Haas described how key social groups within national contexts 
came to support deeper and more expansive integration. New supranational 
institutions became focal points for such actors, not least because these actors were 
able to envisage these new centres of authority as potential suppliers of outcomes that 
were consistent with their preferences (Haas, 1958: 292). Haas also concluded from 
his study of the ECSC that an initial decision to integrate was likely to spawn 
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pressures for deeper and wider integration. Moreover, this would happen 
independently of any overt ideological preference for ‘more Europe’:  
 
Sector integration … begets its own impetus toward extension to the 
entire economy even in the absence of specific group demands and their 
attendant ideologies. Thus, ECSC civil servants speaking for national 
governments have constantly found it necessary to ‘harmonise’ their 
separate policies in order to make it possible for the integrated sectors to 
function, without necessarily implying any ideological commitment to the 
European idea (Haas, 1957: 297).             
 
Spillover was suggestive of automaticity – the idea that the logic of integration is 
somehow self-sustaining, rational and teleological. In this respect, Haas was arguing 
along the same lines as emerging theorists of economic integration (notably Balassa, 
1962) who saw a decision to initiate a free trade area as potentially unleashing a set of 
logics that might culminate eventually in the total merger of hitherto discrete national 
economies overseen by centralised institutions of economic governance. The idea of 
spillover as an automatic process was reinforced with Leon Lindberg’s more 
formalised definition, which  
 
refers to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, 
creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking 
further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for 
more action, and so forth (Lindberg, 1963: 10).   
 
It has often been said that neofunctionalism contained within itself a conception of 
‘cultivated spillover’ (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991), that is a specific theory of how, 
once created supranational institutions act as strategic advocates on behalf of 
functional linkage and deeper/wider integration. The idea does not feature as heavily 
as is sometimes supposed. There are hints in Lindberg’s idea that the actions the new 
institutions create situations that are only resolvable through spillover (1963: 11). In 
his essay ‘International Integration: the European and the Universal Process’, Haas 
(1961) thought through the circumstances in which contracting national governments 
would not default to lowest common denominator outcomes. One such condition 
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would be an act of delegation by those governments of a measure of authority to an 
institution, whose mission would be ‘inherently expansive’ (Haas, 1961: 376). The 
key to provoking spillover dynamics, as Haas later noted, is the exposure of a sector 
or a set of tasks to supranational control (Haas, 2004: xxi). The initial assumption of 
both Haas and Lindberg was that the spillover process was inherently expansive and 
irreversible. 
 
While Haas (1958) and Lindberg (1963) were able to argue that they had detected 
evidence of spillover within the European Communities, the assumption of 
automaticity appeared to run into severe empirical trouble in light of the Gaullist 
recalibration of the EC into a more overtly intergovernmental direction. Moreover, 
and perhaps more tellingly as a test of the theoretical purchase of neofunctionalism, 
spillover appeared to be a phenomenon that was entirely local to the European 
context. Joseph Nye (1971) expressed the problem in terms of the probability that 
neofunctionalism had unearthed a genuine phenomenon, but one that was utterly 
specific to the case and not at all generic to processes of regional integration. A 
logical extension would be to suggest that a theory with spillover at its core could not 
survive in the competition to develop a general explanation of integration worldwide.  
 
This line of thinking is reinforced somewhat if we contemplate the circumstances in 
which neofunctionalism secured a mini-revival during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(see inter alia Mutimer, 1989; Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991). The so-called relance of 
the integration project under the jurisdiction of the Delors Commission seemed to 
suggest that spillovers were once again occurring. However, this partial revival did 
not overcome the objection that spillover was a European specificity, thereby 
underscoring neofunctionalism’s dubious credentials as a theory of integration. Haas 
(1971) himself acknowledged this problem long before this partial rediscovery of his 
theoretical apparatus. Nor did it take into account the substantial amount of work 
undertaken by neofunctionalists in general and Philippe Schmitter (1971, 2004) in 
particular to refine the concept in ways that took account of the possibility of 
disintegrative dynamics taking hold and decoupled the ideas of spillover and 
automaticity.    
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However, a careful re-reading of the development of neofunctionalist thinking casts a 
degree of doubt upon the notion that the lack of spillover elsewhere somehow 
destroys the potential of the theory.  Here it is useful to look at those contributions of 
Haas and others that endeavoured to look beyond the European case and think about 
the probabilities of regional integration taking hold (or not as the case may be) 
elsewhere. At this point there is a very clear recognition, within early 
neofunctionalism, that spillover is to be treated as an empirical phenomenon that is 
found (probably) only in the European Communities. The question then becomes why 
did spillover take hold in the European context? As David Mutimer (1989) notes, 
there is a presupposition in this literature that spillover takes hold only within a set of 
specified conditions, namely situations where there is an a priori interdependence 
between the component economies. Charles Pentland (1973: 119) reinforces this re-
placement of the concept of spillover by describing it as ‘merely an organizing 
concept or hypothesis about the likelihood of integration when certain specified 
conditions are met’. 
 
In other words, the real action in 1960s/1970s neofunctionalism was the search for 
candidate independent variables that might help scholars to assess the likelihood of 
either (a) the initiation of regional integration or (b) the success or failure of 
integration schemes that were already set in motion. Thus the ‘failure’ of first wave 
regional integration to take off in the manner of the European Communities was much 
less of problem for neofunctionalists than might be imagined. Philippe Schmitter  
recently pointed out that the capacity to explain non- or dis-integrative outcomes is a 
unique feature of neofunctionalism in its original guise (Schmitter, 2004: 47) and 
notice how Haas presented the impasse of Latin American integration as a success for 
neofunctionalism: 
 
We predicted successfully that regional integration would not readily 
occur in Latin America and I explained in the preface of The Uniting of 
Europe, 1968 edition, that the explanatory power of NF in leading to new 
political communities was confined to settings characterised by 
industrialised economies, full political mobilisation via strong interest 
groups and political parties, leadership by political elites competing for 
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political dominance under rules of constitutional democracy accepted by 
leaders and followers (Haas, 2001: 29-30, fn2).   
 
In Haas and Schmitter’s careful restatement of neofunctionalism, we find a clear 
hypothesised explanation of why spillover occurs in some situations of integration but 
not in others. The Haas-Schmitter typology suggests that certain unions are more 
prone to automaticity and politicisation (i.e. to spillover) and that the explanation 
resides in a cluster of background variables that account not only for motivations to 
initiate integration schemes, but also for the likelihood of spillover dynamics setting 
in once initiation has commenced. Thus scholars are directed to the ongoing 
examination of these background variables (rates of transaction between participating 
units, the adaptability of participant actors to moments of crisis and the prevalence or 
otherwise within participating units of bureaucratic styles of decision-making) (Haas 
and Schmitter, 1964: 718).   
 
The exploration of ‘background conditions’ is embedded in some of Haas’s earlier 
work on the subject (for example, Haas, 1961), where societal pluralism, high levels 
of economic development and ideological convergence among participating units 
appear as crucial precursors for the formation of regional integration schemes. Having 
said this, the early attempts at theorising background conditions did tend towards 
treating spillover dynamics as a kind of dependent variable (Barrera ad Haas, 1968; 
Haas and Schmitter, 1964). In other words, the search for reliable independent causal 
mechanisms was premised on the idea that what was to be explained was the 
functional and political linkages through which the remit of integration would expand 
and deepen. The conflation of integration and spillover does appear to have been a 
problematic quality of a good deal of neofunctionalist work, but a recovery of Haas’s 
original (much less determinate) definition of integration would imply that the there 
could be a disassociation of the dependent variable from localised European 
discoveries. In particular, as Haas (1971) noted, the recasting of the dependent 
variable of integration theory as the creation of some form of post-national 
community could be explained by independent variables other than those originally 
ascribed by neofunctionalists to the European case. In short, integration 
theory/neofunctionalism should (a) open itself to numerous possible independent 
causal mechanisms and (b) think of its dependent variable as ‘putative’ (1971: 27) and 
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non-teleological. Both explanans and explanadum could be divorced from their 
Eurocentric grounding and neofunctionalist reasoning could still prevail. This would 
necessitate a re-focussing of the neofunctionalist project onto its foundational tenets: 
that integration (whatever its destination) was an instrumentally driven process that 
proceeded through the prosaic interactions of stakeholders whose perceptions, 
cognitions, values and loyalties might change in the course of that interaction.5  
 
The dynamism of neofunctionalism 
There is a temptation to develop presentational ‘snapshots’ of theoretical perspectives, 
where we list a series of foundational propositions, which are then amenable to some 
form of external critique. The foregoing has already hinted that such a reductionist 
approach to neofunctionalism carries with it the danger of (a) misreading the 
intentions of its practitioners and (b) simplifying an otherwise rich and textured 
theory. To these perils must be added the problem of presenting neofunctionalism as a 
static theory, thereby ignoring its almost pathological tendency towards auto-critique. 
This is yet another reason why it is important to understand neofunctionalism’s 
epistemological roots. It is precisely because Haas and his colleagues allied 
themselves explicitly to Weberian social scientific norms that they practised ongoing 
self-reflection and thought very carefully about the limitations of and the necessary 
refinements to their theory of regional integration.  
 
We have noted already how Haas and others worked hard to distinguish the empirical 
discovery of spillover in Europe from the general propositions of their theory. What 
strikes the reader of these works now is how this group of scholars managed to re-
evaluate and reiterate core neofunctionalist ideas in spite of profound empirical and 
epistemological challenges. This section examines three moments where the dynamic 
and reflexive qualities of Haas’s theory became apparent: the empirical challenges to 
neofunctionalism posed by the ‘Gaullist moment’ in the Communities that 
commenced in the mid-1960s, the extensive epistemological self-critiques of the early 
1970s and Haas’s heroic attempt towards the end of his life to reinstate 
neofunctionalist theories of regional integration into academic discourse. 
 
Stanley Hoffmann’s (1966) intergovernmentalist engagement with integration theory 
is probably the best-known example of neofunctionalism coming under sustained 
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pressure.  Hoffmann’s lengthy critique commenced with a demonstration that de 
Gaulle’s ascendancy as a dramatic actor within the Communities provided evidence 
of the enduring qualities of national interests and nationalist sentiment, both of which 
were – in Hoffmann’s reading – neglected or by-passed in neofunctionalist reasoning. 
Along with the later, more social science-oriented intervention of Roger Hansen 
(1969), Hoffmann developed an argument that emphasised the hard barriers between 
‘low’, technocratic politics and ‘high’ politics, where non-negotiable issues of 
national interest came into play. Hence the neofunctionalist prediction of the 
politicisation of functional integration was seriously questioned. To this Hansen 
added arguments about neofunctionalism’s neglect of the role of external structural 
imperatives in shaping member-state preferences in the direction of positive sum 
integrationist bargains.  He also hypothesised that societal pluralism – for 
neofunctionalists a precondition of integration – could be responsible for retarding 
integrative progress as sophisticated societies are better able to receive messages 
about potential threats (such as those posed by supranational institutions) to their 
integrity.   
 
Haas worked through many of these objections in the author’s preface to the second 
edition of The Uniting of Europe (Haas, 1968). While he regretted the apparent 
bracketing of national sentiment in the original formulation of his theory, he did note 
that the original technocratic/‘end of ideology’ assumptions had brought forward the 
important observation that the idea of ‘the nation’ was not fixed and immutable (Haas, 
1968: xiv). Moreover, the impact of de Gaulle in the mid-1960s merely served to 
illustrate the absence of such ‘dramatic actors’ at the Communities’ point of origin 
(Haas, 1968: xxiv). The institutional and strategic design of the ECSC was inscribed 
with functionalist, incrementalist and technocratic logics because these were the 
prevailing ideas of the time. Also, Haas admitted that pluralism is not a static 
condition and that complex European societies had undergone significant change in 
the decade and a half that had elapsed since the Treaty of Paris. This meant that 
societal expectations would develop autonomously of the growth of the Communities 
and thereby have the capacity to exercise independent effects upon the integration 
process as it evolved (Haas, 1968: xv). Finally, and in anticipation of Hansen’s 
arguments Haas took the first steps in acknowledging the significance of exogenous 
stimuli upon the conduct of integration and the constituent states of the Communities. 
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His point – again underlining neofunctionalism’s departure from classical IR – was 
that the imperatives set by the global security structure of the 1940s/1950s did not 
amount to a sufficient condition for the institutional choices made by European actors 
at the time (Haas, 1968: xiv-xv). He later extended the analysis of external conditions 
to postulate that variable (perceptions of) exogenous contexts might help to explain 
why different integration projects might take alternative pathways (Haas, 1975, 1976) 
 
Therefore, critiques of the early intergovernmentalist variety allowed 
neofunctionalists like Haas to clarify their propositions. It is striking how Haas 
responded to his critics by reasserting the significance of societal, external and 
ideational preconditions of integration. In so doing he laid the ground for (a) the 
reorientation of neofunctionalism as a theory of ‘background conditions, (b) 
Schmitter’s (1971) efforts to perfect neofunctionalism as a theory of disintegration as 
much as integration and (c) Nye’s (1971) interest in ‘perceptual’ background 
conditions.  
 
Neofunctionalism’s second moment of auto-critique was centred around Lindberg and 
Scheingold’s edited volume Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Lindberg 
and Scheingold, 1971), a project evidently designed not to plug the holes in a leaky 
theory, but rather to take it to a new level of analytical sophistication (Rosamond, 
2000: 86). Haas’s personal contribution to the project (Haas, 1971) was, as ever vital. 
Aside from his hugely important dissection of the dependent variable problem 
(discussed above), Haas showed how there was an inherent tension between (a) the 
logic of spillover and the attendant presupposition of the politicisation of the 
integration process and (b) the continuing emphasis on integration as a process 
inspired by short-run interest fulfilment and shaped by ‘muddling through’ rather than 
grand designs and dramatic political acts. The logic of (a) would suggest the 
downgrading of (b), yet (b) was given primacy in the neofunctionalist account 
because it helped to explain both conditions of foundation and the conduct of actors 
once the institutional arena was functioning.            
 
In this respect Haas was joined by others in conceptualising integration in political 
systemic terms. This was always present in neofunctionalist writings, a fact that seems 
to have been forgotten (see Rosamond, 2004 for a more detailed argument). Haas’s 
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initial definition of political integration (quoted above) together with Lindberg’s own 
brand of neofunctionalism (Lindberg, 1965; 1967) tied together notions of integration 
and system. The common denominator, yet again, was the consequence of societal 
pluralism and incrementalism as a prevailing political condition. Thus social 
complexity is not only a background condition; it also defines the parameters of 
action within a regional integration project once initiated. Lindberg and Scheingold’s 
(1970) Eastonian take on the European Communities explored the conditions by 
which integrative dynamics might be extended to new sectors and how more 
expansive networks of actors might be drawn into the web of integration. Meanwhile 
Haas’s concept of ‘turbulent fields’ (Haas, 1976) applied to the Community system a 
form of policy analysis that anticipated integrative solutions to dilemmas arising in 
contexts where self-regarding actors operated in a climate of perpetual complexity 
and imperfect knowledge.  
 
In short, neofunctionalism remained true to its roots as a critique of IR orthodoxies. 
Its appropriation of political science and policy analytic ideas of pluralism and 
incrementalism enabled it – eventually – to reach a plateau where the generic sources 
of integration could be hypothesised and where the once rather ‘Whiggish’ idea of 
spillover was not only subsumed, but also refined to the extent that it became 
associated with explanation of how actors engineer greater mutual interdependencies. 
Thus, contrary to some later claims about neofunctionalism, it aspired by the mid-
1970s to offer analytical leverage in two comparative directions. The first involved a 
capacity to formulate a revised theory of regional integration and the second showed 
the way to thinking about how systemic environments should be conceptualised in 
conditions of complexity.        
 
Also apparent was a growing recognition of cognitive and ideational variables as key 
to understanding integrative processes. It is fitting, therefore, that Haas’s final 
contributions to EU studies (2001; 2004) should devote themselves to exploring the 
connections between neofunctionalism and constructivism. This matter is dealt with 
elsewhere in this special issue, but for the sake of this paper’s argument it is worth 
emphasising that Haas’s neofunctionalism was shot through with an interest in 
cognitions, perceptions, the sociological dimensions of institutionalised interaction 
and what we would now label intersubjectivities. 
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Having said that, the attempt to consummate some sort of meta-theoretical union 
between constructivism and mature neofunctionalism does present difficulties, which 
– for some – are likely to pose profound problems. In the first place, neofunctionalism 
and constructivism are different varieties of theory in that the latter in a ‘first 
principles’ claim about the social (as opposed to rationalistic) status of interaction. 
Thus there are obvious and potentially irresolvable oppositions at an ontological level 
between theoretical treatments of integration that follow from constructivist premises 
(see Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener, 2001; Risse, 2004) and varieties of 
rationalist theory (such as neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism). Perhaps 
Haas’s late moves to look for points of reconciliation between the two approaches can 
be read as consistent with the claim made by some (notably Fearon and Wendt, 2002) 
that, while ontological differences between rationalists and constructivists remain 
deep and insoluble, there is nevertheless a case for the pragmatic ‘bracketing’ of these 
metatheoretical disagreements.      
 
Conclusions 
This paper has tried to offer a re-evaluation of neofunctionalist thinking, paying 
particular attention to the contributions made by Haas. The core argument, stated 
simply, is that stereotypical constructions of neofunctionalism tend to (a) place the 
theory firmly in a camp labelled IR and (b) treat neofunctionalism rather too 
statically. The intention here has been to tease out ways in which neofunctionalism 
continues to speak relevantly to contemporary EU studies. A re-reading of the work of 
Haas and his various collaborators and associates is essential to show that the story of 
neofunctionalism is better told as a tale of theory building and evaluation that 
resonates with long-established social scientific norms. The twin ideas that it was 
defeated by the unravelling realities of the European Communities and a drastic loss 
of analytical leverage deserve (at the very least) to come under sustained scrutiny. 
Aside from the obvious bridges between neofunctionalism circa 1958-1976 and 
twenty-first century treatments of the EU polity such as multi-level governance and 
historical and sociological institutionalism, there are two further lessons to be drawn.  
 
First, if the re-inspection of Haas’s work reveals that – in his words – 
neofunctionalism ‘is no longer obsolescent’ (Haas, 2004: liii), then the candidacy of 
neofunctionalism for reinstatement within theories of comparative regionalism should 
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be seriously considered. The latter has recently undergone something of a revival, but 
within this academic discourse neofunctionalism has been treated very much as a 
component of the ‘old’ (as opposed to the ‘new’) regionalism. As Alex Warleigh has 
recently argued (Warleigh, 2004), the drawing of hard boundaries between these two 
phases of regional integration studies parallels the processes of differentiation that this 
paper cautions against. The second lesson is more localised to EU studies. The 
recovery of neofunctionalism from its reputation as a failed academic experiment is 
rather more than an exercise in academic excavation. The fact that it was buried in the 
first place is indicative of a tendency within the present scholarly community to 
produce narratives of the field’s history that draw robust boundaries between past 
errors and present rigour. In the wrong hands this can induce all manner of closures 
and the establishment of claims that effectively outlaw particular kinds of work. 
Beyond its (recovered) analytical salience, neofunctionalism was/is a remarkably 
open-minded intellectual project that drew sustenance from across the spectrum of the 
social sciences. In this regard, there is no better exemplar for scholars of the EU than 
Ernst Haas.  
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Notes 
* I am grateful for the comments on an earlier draft of this article by an anonymous 
referee and Tanja Börzel. Others who have helped formulate, clarify and 
(occasionally) endorse my thoughts on neofunctionalism include Maura Adshead, 
Ernst B. Haas, Knud Erik Jørgensen, Ian Manners, Alberta Sbragia, Philippa 
Sherrington, Helen Wallace, Alex Warleigh and Daniel Wincott. 
 
1. The caricature of IR that emerges in such critiques of neofunctionalism is also 
deeply problematic, but largely beyond the scope of this paper (see Rosamond, 
2000: ch. 7; 2004 for more detailed arguments). Haas himself seemed 
perplexed and somewhat irritated by the debate about whether IR or 
comparative political science should be the appropriate parent discipline of EU 
studies – a debate he dismissed as ‘silly’ (Haas, 2004: xv1, fn4) 
2. Mitrany’s work on functionalism spanned some four decades. Many of his key 
works on the subject are gathered in Mitrany, 1975. 
3. Hix’s (1994) rejection of integration theory together with the research agenda 
endorsed by the relatively new journal European Union Politics should be 
read as one way in which the sui generis, n = 1 dilemma can be resolved. By 
changing the co-ordinates of EU studies to think of the EU as a political 
system of the sort familiar to seasoned political scientists, numerous 
comparators (i.e. other political systems) come to the fore.   
4. I note en passant that the term ‘spillover’ does not feature in the index of The 
Uniting of Europe.  
5. Perhaps the most systematic attempt to re-state neofunctionalist premises in 
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